Nash Social Welfare for Indivisible Items under Separable,
  Piecewise-Linear Concave Utilities by Anari, Nima et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
61
2.
05
19
1v
3 
 [c
s.G
T]
  6
 A
pr
 20
17
Nash Social Welfare for Indivisible Items under
Separable, Piecewise-Linear Concave Utilities
Nima Anari ∗ Tung Mai † Shayan Oveis Gharan ‡ Vijay V. Vazirani§
Abstract
Recently Cole and Gkatzelis [CG15] gave the first constant factor approximation algorithm
for the problem of allocating indivisible items to agents, under additive valuations, so as to
maximize the Nash social welfare (NSW). We give constant factor algorithms for a substantial
generalization of their problem – to the case of separable, piecewise-linear concave utility func-
tions. We give two such algorithms, the first using market equilibria and the second using the
theory of stable polynomials.
In AGT, there is a paucity of methods for the design of mechanisms for the allocation of
indivisible goods and the result of [CG15] seemed to be taking a major step towards filling this
gap. Our result can be seen as another step in this direction.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that designing mechanisms for allocating indivisible items is much harder than
for divisible items. In a sense, this dichotomy holds widely in the field of algorithm, e.g., consider
the difference in complexity of solving linear programs vs integer linear programs. This difference
is most apparent in the realm of computability of market equilibria, where even though the first
result introducing market equilibria to the AGT community, namely [DPS02], dealt with the case of
indivisible goods, there is a paucity of results for this case. We are only aware of [CR07, BM15]; the
first deals with smooth Fisher markets, in which small changes in prices cause only proportionately
small changes in demand, and the second studies the question of allocating indivisible resources
using the notion of competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI), giving algorithms and
hardness results for two classes of valuations, namely perfect substitutes and perfect complements.
On the other hand, very impressive progress has been made for the case of divisible goods, e.g.,
see [DPS02, DPSV08, DV03, JMS03, Jai07, CDDT09, VY11, DK08, CSVY06, GMSV12, GMV14,
CT09, CPY13].
Recently Cole and Gkatzelis [CG15] took a major step towards developing methodology for
designing mechanisms for the allocation of indivisible items. They gave the first constant factor
approximation algorithm for the problem of allocating indivisible items to agents, under additive
valuations, so as to maximize the Nash social welfare (NSW).
They studied the following problem. We are given a set of m indivisible items and we want to
assign them to n agents. An allocation vector is a vector x ∈ {0, 1}[n]×[m] such that for each item
i, exactly one xa,i is 1. Perhaps, the simplest model for the utility of an agent is the linear model.
That is, each agent a has a non-negative utility ua,i for an item i and the utility that a receives for
an allocation x is
ua(x) =
m∑
i=1
xaiuai.
The NSW objective is to compute an allocation x that maximizes the geometric mean of agents’
utilities, (
n∏
a=1
ua(x)
) 1
n
.
The above objective naturally encapsulates both fairness and efficiency and has been extensively
studied as a notion of fair division (see [Mou04, CKM+16] and references therein). Cole and
Gkatzelis [CG15] designed a 2e1/e approximation algorithm for the above problem. This was later
improved independently to e in [AOSS17] and 2 in [CDG+16].
The case of indivisible goods is clearly very significant in AGT and there is a need to develop
our understanding of such problems, both in terms of positive and negative results. It is therefore
natural to study generalizations of the Cole-Gkatzelis setting. Clearly, linear utility functions are
too restrictive. In economics, concave utility functions occupy a special place because of their
generality and because they capture the natural condition of decreasing marginal utilities. Since
we wish to study allocation of indivisible items, we will assume that utility functions are piecewise-
linear concave and additively separable over item types. In this paper, we obtain a constant factor
approximation algorithm for NSW under these utilities – this is a substantial generalization of the
problem of [CG15].
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The study of computability of market equilibria started with positive results for the case of
linear utility functions [DPS02, DPSV08, DV03, JMS03, Jai07]. However, its generalization to
separable, piecewise-linear concave (SPLC) utilities was open for several years before it was shown
to be PPAD-complete [CT09, CDDT09, VY11]. Our first belief was that NSW under SPLC utilities
should not admit a constant factor algorithm and that the resolution of this problem lay in the
realm of hardness of approximation results. Therefore, our positive result came as a surprise. We
give constant factor approximation algorithms for our problem using two very different techniques.
1.1 Problem Formulation
Assume that there are n agents and m item types. For item type i, assume that we have a supply
of ki units. The utility of each agent is separable over item types, but over each item type it is
piecewise-linear concave.
Now define uaij to be the marginal utility that agent a receives from the j-th copy of item i.
For each agent a and item type i we assume
uai1 ≥ aai2 ≥ · · · ≥ uaiki ≥ 0
An allocation vector x is a vector where for each item type i,∑
a,j
xaij ≤ ki.
We say x is an integral allocation vector if all coordinates of x are 0 or 1. In other words, we
allocate at most ki copies of each item type i. For an allocation vector x, the utility of agent a is
ua(x) =
m∑
i=1
ki∑
j=1
xaijuaij .
For clarity of notation throughout this paper we use
∏
a ua(x) to denote the Nash welfare of an
allocation x. With this notation, the goal is to maximize the product of utilities of all agents. This
problem can be captured by the following integer program:
max
xaij

 n∏
a=1
m∑
i=1
ki∑
j=1
xaijuaij


1/n
,
s.t.
n∑
a=1
ki∑
j=1
xaij ≤ ki ∀i
xaij ∈ {0, 1} ∀a, i, j
(1)
1.2 Contributions
Our emphasis in this paper is on the development of techniques for designing mechanisms for the
allocation of indivisible items. We prove our main theorem using two different techniques. The
first one exploits the structure of the market equilibrium, building on [CG15].
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Theorem 1.1. The spending restricted algorithm given in Figure 2 runs in polynomial time and
yields a fractional allocation which when rounded using the algorithm in Figure 3, gives a factor 2
approximation algorithm for NSW for SPLC utilities.
The factor 2 algorithm for the linear case was shown to be tight in [CDG+16]. Hence, the
bound for our algorithm stated above is also tight.
Our second approach is purely algebraic and uses the machinery of real stable polynomials,
building on [AOSS17, AO17].
Theorem 1.2. Program (6) is a convex relaxation of the Nash-welfare maximization problem with
SPLC utilities. There is a randomized algorithm that rounds any feasible solution of the convex
program to an integral solution with the Nash welfare at least 1/e2 fraction of the optimum (of (6))
in expectation.
1.3 Techniques
In this part we discuss the main new ideas behind our two proofs. We start with the market
equilibrium result.
Techniques Used in Market Equilibrium Approach. The starting point of [CG15], hence-
forth called the CG-result, was a new market model in the Fisher setting called the spending
restricted model. They modified the Fisher model as follows: each buyer has $1 and the amount of
money that can be spent on any good is at most $1, regardless of its price. As a result, the amount
of good i sold is min(1, 1/pi), assuming unit amount of each good in the market. Moreover, since
the total spending on any good can be at most $1, the price of a highly desirable good is pushed
higher and at equilibrium, each high priced good (having price 1 or more) is (essentially) allocated
to one buyer. Clearly utilities of buyers can be scaled arbitrarily. At this point, the CG algorithm
scales utilities of all buyers so that their utility from their maximum bang-per-buck goods equals
the equilibrium prices. Now, the product of the prices of high price items is an upper bound on
OPT and the remaining problem is only to assign the low price items integrally – in the equilibrium,
they have been allocated fractionally. This is done via rounding.
[CG15] gave a combinatorial polynomial time algorithm for finding an equilibrium in the spend-
ing restricted model by modifying combinatorial algorithms for finding equilibria for Fisher markets
under linear utility functions [DPSV08, Orl10]. As mentioned above, equilibrium computation for
SPLC utilities is not in P and so this starting point is not available to us. The closest thing available
is that if one assumes perfect price discrimination, then a polynomial time algorithm was given by
[GV11]. However, our problem has little to do with price discrimination. Our first task therefore
was to define a suitable market model that will compute a fractional allocation which provides an
upper bound on the optimal NSW and to which rounding can be applied.
Our key clue comes from the observation that equilibrium prices of goods provide a proxy for
the utility accrued by the agent who gets this good. The dilemma is that our market has multiple
items of each type and the same agent may derive different utility from different items of the same
type. Thus, our market model should sell different items of the same type for different prices! At
this point, it was natural for us to define a market model in which agents pay for utility rather
than the amount of items they receive. In our model we impose a spending restriction of $1 on
each item of each type.
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In our new market model buyers have SPLC utility functions and have unit money each. There
is a base price for each type of item. If an agent buys more than one item of the same type, he
spends the base price for the item that he receives the least utility from. For all other items of this
type that he buys, the price of the item for him is scaled up so that the ratio of price/utility is the
same. If the price of type i is pi, then the amount of an item of this type that is sold at equilibrium
is min(1, 1/pi). We call our model the utility allocation market, since buyers pay for the amount of
utility they accrue, in a certain well defined way (see Section 2.1).
Computing an equilibrium in this model is not straightforward. Our algorithm iteratively
computes better and better approximations to the equilibrium via scaling, using a parameter ∆
which halves after each iteration. We maintain the invariant that the base price of each type can
only increase. In each scaling iteration, buyers start with surplus money and spend it all by the end
of the iteration. The amount spent on each good can exceed its spending restriction, but by at most
∆. The main difficulty in executing an iteration under SPLC utilities is that as base prices change,
the money charged for different items of the same type changes by different amounts because of
the different utilities buyers accrue from them.
Our rounding algorithm is a generalization of the ones in [CG15, CDG+16]. We first allocate to
agents the integral part of their allocation. The new difficulty lies in that the fractional allocations
of a given item type add up to more than one item in general and there may not be a way of
partitioning the fractions so that they add up to a unit each. To get around this, we use information
in the obtained fractional allocation to create a new instance under linear utilities. We apply the
rounding procedure of [CDG+16] to the latter instance and it yields an allocation for our SPLC
problem. A critical step in this proof is showing that the upper bound which [CDG+16] compare
their solution to also applies to our SLPC instance. Hence we get a factor 2 algorithm for the NSW
problem with SPLC utilities.
Techniques Used in Real Stability Approach. Our second proof is purely algebraic and
exploits the theory of real stable polynomials (see [Pem12] for background). Consider an integral
allocation vector x; recall that the Nash welfare corresponding to this allocation is
∏
a ua(x). Note
that this function is log concave in x and it can be maximized by standard convex programming
tools. Unfortunately, the ratio of the optimum of this convex program and the welfare of the
optimum integral allocation can be unbounded in the worst case [CG15]. Let x be an arbitrary
fractional allocation, and suppose we allocate the items using the natural randomized rounding
method: For each item type i, we generate ki samples (a, j) independently where each sample
is equal to (a, j) with probability xaij/ki, for all a, j. We can study the (expected) welfare of
this algorithm by summing up a subset of coefficients of a multivariate polynomial. Consider the
polynomial
px(y1, . . . , ym) =
∏
a
m∑
i=1
ki∑
j=1
xaijuaijyi.
If ki = 1 for all i, then the (expected) welfare of the above randomized rounding algorithm is just
the sum of the coefficients of multi-linear terms of the above polynomial. This is the main idea of
[AOSS17].
In our case, however, the (expected) welfare of the randomized rounding algorithm (up to a
normalizing factor and a loss of en) is the sum of the coefficients of all monomials of px of degree
n where the degree of each yi is at most ki (see Lemma 3.7). As a sanity check, observe that if x
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was indeed integral only these monomials have nonzero coefficients in px(y1, . . . , ym). Therefore,
the question boils down to writing a convex relaxation of the sum of coefficients of monomials of p
of degree n where the degree of each yi is at most ki.
We use a recent result [AO17] where it is shown that for any real stable polynomial p and any
subset S of monomials of p that “correspond” to a real stable polynomial, there is a convex function
that approximates the sum of coefficients of monomials of p in S within a factor of ek where k is
the largest degree of monomials in S (see Theorem 3.4 for more details). To be precise, consider
the polynomial
q(y1, . . . , ym) =
∂nt
n!
n∏
i=1
ki∑
j=0
tjyji
∣∣∣
t=0
,
i.e., the coefficient of tn in
∏n
i=1
∑ki
j=0 t
jyji . This polynomial has all monomials of degree n in
y1, . . . , ym such that the degree of each yi is at most ki; the coefficient of each such monomial is 1.
To put it differently, q can be seen as the generating polynomial of the set of bases of a laminar
matroid of depth 2.
The expected welfare of our randomized rounding algorithm is q(∂y)px(y)|y=0, up to normaliza-
tions. Unfortunately, polynomial q is not real stable (see Section 3.1 for definition of real stability);
so Theorem 3.4 is not applicable. Instead, we work with a real stable polynomial q˜(y1, . . . , ym) such
that q˜ ≈ q. Let,
q˜(y1, . . . , ym) =
∂K−nt
(K − n)!
m∏
i=1
(t+ yi/ki)
ki
∣∣∣
t=0
,
where K =
∑
i ki; in other words, q˜ is the coefficient of t
K−n in
∏m
i=1(t+ yi/ki)
ki . It is not hard to
see that the above polynomial is real stable. Furthermore, the coefficient of each monomial of q˜ is
at least e−n, i.e., q˜ is an en approximation of q at any point. So, up to another loss of en we can
use Theorem 3.4 to find a fractional allocation vector x that maximizes q˜(∂y)px(y)|y=0; this gives
our convex relaxation of the NSW with SPLC utilities. Then, it follows that the above randomized
rounding algorithm receives at least e2n fraction of the optimum welfare in expectation.
1.4 Overview of the Paper
In Section 2 we give our algorithm using the market-based approach. In Section 2.1 we define our
utility allocation market model in which buyers are charged according to the utility they accrue –
thus two items of the same type could end up costing different amounts not only to two different
buyers but also to the same buyer. Next we give the spending restricted version of this model. In
Section 2.2 we give a combinatorial polynomial time algorithm for finding an equilibrium in this
market. The output of this algorithm is a fractional allocation. In Section 2.3.1 we show how to
derive an upper bound on OPT from this allocation. Finally, in Section 2.3.2 we show how to round
this solution, hence yielding a factor 2 approximation algorithm.
In Section 3 we give our algorithm based on real stable polynomials. Section 3.1 defines key
concepts and states the relevant theorems of Gurvits and [AO17]. In Section 3.2 we give our convex
program for this approach, followed by an algorithm for rounding the fractional allocation obtained
by solving this convex program. We prove that this yields an e2-approximation algorithm for our
problem.
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2 The Market-Based Approach
2.1 Spending-Restricted Utility Allocation Market
Utility Allocation Market We will assume there are n agents and m item-types in the market.
Each type i has a supply of ki items. The utility of each agent is additively separable over the item
types, but piecewise-linear concave over each type of items. Each agent has a budget of one dollar,
and each type i has a base price pi for a single item of that type. The price of an item to an agent
can be more than its base price as defined below. We denote (a, i, j) by the j-th item of type i that
a receives (fractionally).
Definition 2.1. The bang-per-buck of an item for an agent a is the ratio of utility a derives from
the item and the amount of money a spends on the item.
Admissible Spending Given a set of prices, an agent can only spend his money in a certain
way. Roughly speaking, each agent spends so that he gets optimal utility for the amount of money
he spends at current prices. We define an admissible spending of an agent a as follows:
Definition 2.2. An admissible spending of agent a is a spending such that:
1. The money a spends is at most his budget.
2. There exists a value ba such that for each (a, i, j):
(a) If ba < uaij/pi, (a, i, j) is called a superior item. In this case, a must spend
uaij
ba
to get
the full item (xaij = 1).
(b) If ba = uaij/pi, (a, i, j) is called an active item. In this case, a can spend xaijpi to get
xaij fraction of the item.
(c) If ba > uaij/pi, (a, i, j) is called an inferior item. In this case, a must not spend on
(a, i, j) (xaij = 0).
The corresponding ba is called the bang-per-buck of a.
The equivalent notion of admissible spending in linear utility Fisher market is simply spending
on items that maximize the ratio of utility to price. Moreover, with respect to an admissible
spending, the total amount of money a spends on (a, i, j) can be written as pixaij + qaij where
qaij =
{
uaij
ba
− pi if (a, i, j) is a superior item,
0 otherwise.
We call pixaij the base spending and qaij the extra utility spending of a on the item.
The extra utility spending captures our idea that buyers are charged according to the utility
they accrue. Specifically, the q-variables guarantee that the bang-per-buck value is the same for all
items that a receives. In other words, a has to pay more for items that give him more utility, even
though they might be of the same type.
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Spending-Restricted Equilibrium A price p is spending-restricted equilibrium price if there
exists an admissible spending for each buyer such that the budgets are fully spent and the total
base spending on each item of type i is exactly min(pi, 1). The corresponding allocation x is called
a spending-restricted allocation.
Note that in this spending-restricted equilibrium, items with price greater than 1 do not have
to be completely sold. Moreover, the total spending on each item is at most 1 (hence the name
spending-restricted). To see this, consider an arbitrary item. If it is a superior item, there is only
one agent spending on it. Therefore, the total spending on the item is at most the budget of the
agent, i.e., 1. Otherwise, if it is not a superior item, the total spending on it is equal to the base
spending and bounded by 1.
2.2 Algorithm to Compute an Equilibrium Solution
High-level Idea of the Approach Recall that our goal is to compute a price and an allocation
such that:
1. The spending of each agent is an admissible spending.
2. Each buyer spends all his budget.
3. The total base spending on all items of type i is kimin(pi, 1).
Following the approach of [DPSV08], the idea of our algorithm is maintaining conditions 1 and
3 while satisfying condition 2 gradually. Note that condition 1 makes sure that the money spent
by buyers is at most their budget. The algorithm maintains a price for each item type and a
bang-per-buck value for each agent. As the algorithm progresses, prices are increased and bang-
per-buck values are decreased so that buyers with surplus money have an opportunity to spend
their remaining budgets, without violating conditions 1 and 3. When the money of all buyers is
completely spent, all three conditions are satisfied and the algorithm terminates.
Scaling Technique To obtain a polynomial running time, we use a scaling technique similar to
the ones in [Orl10] and [CG15]. As a consequence, rather than maintaining the third condition
exactly, we make sure that it is approximately satisfied. Let
pi(∆) =
{
⌈pi/∆⌉ ∆ if pi is not a multiple of ∆,
pi +∆ otherwise.
We give the following definition of ∆-allocation.
Definition 2.3. An allocation x is a ∆-allocation with respect to a price vector p if the spending
of each agent is an admissible spending, and the total base spending on all items of type i is at least
kimin{1, pi} and at most kimin{1, pi(∆)}. We say that p supports a ∆-allocation. If the agents
spend all their budgets in a ∆-allocation, x is called a full ∆-allocation.
Our scaling algorithm maintains a ∆-allocation at all steps for appropriate values of ∆. Specif-
ically, ∆ must be a power of 2 and is halved each scaling phase as the algorithm processes.
Note that as ∆ gets smaller, the value of pi(∆) gets closer to pi, and the approximate version
of condition 3 gets closer to the exact version. One can show that within O(K log Vmax) where
Vmax = maxa,i,j,i′,j′{
uaij
uai′j′
} and K =
∑m
i=1 ki is the total number of items, the value of ∆ is small
enough, and hence a full ∆-allocation gives an exact solution.
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The Network N(p,b) A key ingredient of the algorithm lies in constructing and computing
max-flow in a directed network which we call N(p,b). The first step of our construction of N(p,b)
is to fully assign all superior items. To be precise, for each triplet (a, i, j) such that
uaij
pi
> ba, we
set xaij = 1 and charge a the amount
uaij
ba
. At the end of this step, let ea be the amount of money
agent a spends on superior items and li be the number of superior items of type i.
We then construct a directed network as follows. The network has a source s, a sink t and vertex
sets A and I corresponding to agents and item-types respectively. The source s is connected to
each agent a’s vertex via a directed edge of capacity 1− ea. Let c(pi,∆) = min{1, pi(∆)}. For each
item-type i, there is an an edge from type i’s vertex to t of capacity (ki − li)c(pi,∆). Finally, for
each active item, there is an edge from the corresponding agent to the type of the item of capacity
c(pi,∆).
All the active allocations are done by computing a maximum flow in this network. Specifically,
the amount of flow from an agent a to a type i corresponds to the amount that a spends on active
items of type i.
2.2.1 A Subroutine
We give a price-increase algorithm that takes as input a parameter ∆, a price p that supports a
∆-allocation and the corresponding bang-per-buck b of the allocation. The algorithm then returns
a price which supports a full ∆-allocation together with its bang-per-buck vector. The algorithm
is given in Figure 1. Note that ∆ remains unchanged throughout the algorithm.
The first step of the algorithm computes a max-flow in N(p,b). The amount of flow in the
network together with the allocation of superior items gives a ∆-allocation. If the agents spend all
of their budgets, we have a full ∆-allocation. Step 2 of the algorithm returns the current price p
and allocation x if that happens.
Step 3 finds a set X ⊆ A and Y ⊆ B such that (s ∪X ∪ Y, t ∪ (A \X) ∪ (B \ Y )) forms a
min-cut with maximum number of vertices on t side of the cut. Since it is a min-cut, all edges from
X to I \ Y are saturated. Furthermore, all edges from A \ X to Y carry no flow, and all agents
with surplus money are in X. Since the cut maximizes the number of vertices on the t side, there
is no tight set T ∈ Y . We say that a set T ∈ Y is tight if in the current network Γ(T ) = S, and the
total capacity of edges in (s, S) is at most the total capacity of edges in (T, t). Here, Γ(T ) denote
the set of agent-vertices in X connected to T through an edge in the network. Clearly, if there is
a tight set T ∈ Y , the cut defined by s ∪ (X \ Γ(T )) ∪ (Y \ T ) must also be a min-cut with more
vertices on the t side. The following lemma gives a crucial observation about the two sets X and
Y .
Lemma 2.4. For all y ∈ Y , the edge (y, t) is saturated. Furthermore, if the capacity of (y, t)
increases, some agents in X can spend more money.
Proof. Let y be an arbitrary vertex in Y . Define a reachable subgraph R as follows:
R = {v ∈ X ∪ Y : ∃ a directed path from v to y in the residual graph of N(p,b) \ {s, t}} .
In other words, R is the set of vertices in X ∪ Y that are reachable from y via paths alternating
between edges in the reverse direction and edges carrying flow in the forward direction.
Let RX = R ∩X and RY = R ∩X. Since all edges from A \X to Y carry no flow, the total
flow from s to RX is equal to the total flow from RY to t. Furthermore, since s ∪X ∪ Y defines a
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min-cut with maximum number of vertices on the t side, the total capacity of edges from s to RX
must be greater than the total capacity of edges from RY to t. It follows that there must be an
agent in RX with surplus money.
Let x ∈ RX be an agent with surplus money. From the definition of R, there is a residual path
from x to y in N(p,b)\{s, t}. Therefore, if (y, t) is not saturated, there exists a residual path from
x to t. This contradicts the fact that the flow in N(p,b) is a maximum flow. By the same reason,
if the capacity of (y, t) increases, x can take the chance to spend more money.
The final step increases price of the item-types in Y and decreases the bang-per-buck of agents
in X in proportion. The increase in the prices of the types in Y can allow agents with surplus
money in X to spend their remaining budgets. As the prices increase, the following events might
happen:
1. An inferior item of type i in I \ Y may become active for agent a in X. This can happen
because the bang-per-buck values of agents in X keep decreasing. If this event occurs, we
add the corresponding edge from a to i with capacity c(pi,∆) to the network.
2. A superior item of type i in Y may become active for agent a in A \ X. This can happen
because the prices of types in Y keep increasing. If this event occurs, we add the corresponding
edge from a to i with capacity c(pi,∆). Also, since the item is no longer a superior item, we
need to adjust the capacity of edges (s, a) and (i, t) accordingly.
3. The capacity of a type i in Y may increase. This can happen if pi is less than 1. If this event
occurs, some agents with surplus money in X have a chance to spend their budget. As a
consequence, some sets in Y might go tight.
Running Time We give an upper bound on the running time of the algorithm in Figure 1 as a
function of the surplus money of the agents.
Lemma 2.5. PriceIncrease (∆,p,b) runs in poly(K, s) time if the total surplus money of the
agents is s∆.
Proof. Clearly, the first 3 steps of the algorithm run in polynomial-time. It is also easy to see
that computing the prices and bang-per-buck values at which the next event happens requires
polynomial-time. Therefore, it suffices to show that the number of events is polynomial in K and
s as well.
First, consider an event in which the capacity c(pi,∆) increases for some type i. By Lemma 2.4,
if this event occurs, some agents with surplus money in X have a chance to spend their remaining
budget. Therefore, ∆ more budget is spent in the ∆-allocation for the new prices, except the cases
where some agents have less than ∆ surplus budget. However, such cases can only happen at most
n times. Also, notice that the total amount of unspent budget can only go up when a superior
item becomes active. However, in that case the increase in unspent budget can be spent in the
next max-flow computation. It follows that the number of capacity increase events is bounded by
poly(n, s).
Consider an event in which an inferior item becomes active. If this event occurs, the item
will remain active for the corresponding agent until some capacities increase. Therefore, there can
be at most poly(K) such events per capacity increase event. A similar argument can be applied
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(p′,b′) = PriceIncrease (∆,p,b)
Input: Parameter ∆, price vector p and a bang-per-buck vector b that support a ∆-allocation,
valuation uaij for each (a, i, j).
Output: A price vector p′ and a bang-per-buck vector b′ that support a full ∆-allocation.
1. Compute a max-flow in N(p,b).
2. If the agents spend all their money, return the current p and x.
3. Let X ⊆ A and Y ⊆ B such that (s ∪ X ∪ Y, t ∪ A \ X ∪ B \ Y ) forms a min-cut with
maximum number of vertices on t side of the cut. Remove edges from agents in X to
item-types in I \ Y , and fully allocate the corresponding items.
4. Increase prices of item types in Y and decrease the bang-per-buck of agents in X in
proportion until one of these following happens:
(a) If an inferior item of type i becomes active for agent a, add an edge from a to i with
capacity c(pi,∆). Go to Step 1.
(b) If a superior item of type i becomes active for agent a, add an edge from a to i with
capacity c(pi,∆). Update the capacity of edges (s, a) and (i, t). Go to Step 1.
(c) If c(pi,∆) increases for some i ∈ Y , go to Step 1.
Figure 1: A Price-Increase Subroutine.
to the case in which a superior item becomes active. It follows that the total running time of
PriceIncrease is polynomial in s and K.
Correctness
Lemma 2.6. PriceIncrease (∆,p,b) returns a full ∆-allocation with the corresponding price p
and bang-per-buck b.
Proof. Since Step 2 of the algorithm guarantees that it always terminates with the agents spending
all of their money, it suffices to show that the algorithm maintains a ∆-allocation at every step.
To begin, the input price p and bang-per-buck b are given such that they support a ∆-allocation.
Therefore, constructing N(p,b) and finding a maximum flow in this network give a ∆-allocation.
We will show that when each event in Step 4 happens, the current price p and bang-per-buck b
still support a ∆-allocation. Note that whenever we raise the price of items in Y , we also decrease
the bang-per-buck of agents in X by the same factor. Therefore, all edges from X to Y remain.
Moreover, all edges that disappear are from A \ X to Y and carry no flow. It follows that the
spending that was computed before we raised prices is still a valid spending.
If an inferior item becomes active, all the capacities remain unchanged, and the ∆-allocation
that the algorithm had before remains a ∆-allocation.
If a superior item of type i becomes active, the capacity of (s, a) increases by pi, and the capacity
of (i, t) increases by pi(∆). Moreover, the edge from a to i also have capacity of exactly pi(∆).
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Therefore, the next maximum flow computation will give a ∆-allocation.
Finally, if the capacity of some item-type i increases, the algorithm still maintains a ∆-allocation.
To see this, notice that when this event occurs, pi is a multiple of ∆, and pi+∆ ≤ 1. Moreover, the
capacity of (i, t) increases by exactly k′i∆ where k
′
i is the number of remaining items of type i. By
Lemma 2.4, the edge (i, t) must be saturated with flow of value k′ipi before its capacity increases.
After the capacity increases, the flow on (i, t) must be at least k′ipi and at most k
′
ipi(∆). This value
of flow corresponds to the amount of base spending on active items of type i. Since the amount of
base spending on each superior item of type i is exactly pi, the total base spending on all items of
type i is at least kipi and at most kipi(∆).
2.2.2 Polynomial Time Algorithm
In this section, we give a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a spending-restricted equilibrium
(Figure 2).
(p,x) = ScalingAlgorithm
Input: Valuation uaij for each (a, i, j).
Output: Spending-restricted price p and allocation x.
1. Let ∆ = O(1/K). Initialize p and b.
2. For r = 1 to r ∈ O(K log Vmax) do:
(a) (p,b)← PriceIncrease (∆,p,b).
(b) ∆← ∆/2.
Figure 2: A Polynomial Time Algorithm for Computing a Spending-Restricted Equilibrium.
The algorithm starts with ∆ = O(1/K). Specifically, ∆ is set to be the largest power of 2 that
is at most 1/2K.
The first step of the algorithm computes initial price p and bang-per-buck b together with a
∆-allocation corresponding to these prices and bang-per-buck values. We will explain the details
of this step later.
The algorithm then repeatedly calls PriceIncrease on the current (p,b) and halves ∆ in
each scaling phase. Notice that when ∆ is halved, the capacities of some edges may decrease. As a
result, some agents may have surplus money. However, the algorithm still maintains a ∆-allocation
with respect to the new ∆. After O(K log Vmax) scaling phases, the algorithm terminates with a
full ∆-allocation for ∆ = O(2−K/Vmax).
Initialization We initialize price p and bang-per-buck b for which there exists a ∆-allocation.
We assume that ∆ is at most 1/2K.
To begin, we pick an arbitrary agent i and find an appropriate p and bi such that i demands
all the items that he derives positive utility from. This can be done by setting pi = uaiki/M for a
large number M and ba small enough. M is chosen large enough so that a only spends at most a
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half of his budget. Furthermore, the bang-per-buck of other agents is also set to be very large, and
hence they only demand items of type i such that pi = uaiki = 0.
If a derives positive utility from all items, that is, uaiki > 0 for all i, then we are done since a
has enough money to pay an extra amount of ∆ for each item. Also, if there is no more demand on
a type i with zero price, then we can leave pi = 0 since items of type i don’t have to be fully sold.
Therefore, we may assume that there is at least one agent a′ other than a demanding an item of
type i with pi = 0. In this case, we raise pi by a small amount and set ba′ so that a
′ only demands
(some of) the remaining items of type i.
We then continue in this manner until all items with positive price are fully sold. The price
p supports a ∆-allocation since all prices can be scaled to small values such that no agent spends
more than 1/2, and hence agents can pay an extra amount of ∆ for each item.
Running Time
Theorem 2.7. ScalingAlgorithm returns a full ∆-allocation for ∆ = O(2−K/Vmax) in polyno-
mial time.
Proof. Since the initial value of ∆ is O(1/K), by Lemma 2.5, the first call of PriceIncrease
takes polynomial time. We will show that each subsequent call of PriceIncrease runs in poly-
nomial time as well. Lemma 2.6 guarantees that at the beginning of each subsequent call of
PriceIncrease on parameter ∆, the price p and bang-per-buck b support a 2∆-allocation. When
the value changes from 2∆ to ∆, for each i, pi(∆) can either decrease by ∆ or remain unchanged.
It follows that the total unspent budget can be at most K∆. Lemma 2.5 can be applied again to
show that each subsequent call of PriceIncrease terminates in polynomial time.
2.3 Rounding a Spending-Restricted Solution
2.3.1 Upper Bound on OPT
Since scaling the valuations of the agents does not affect the solution of our problem, given a
spending-restricted equilibrium price vector p, we can always scale the valuations of the agents
such that the bang-per-buck of each agent from the equilibrium allocation is exactly 1. We say that
the valuations of the agents are normalized for p. The following lemma gives an upper bound for the
NSW of the optimal integral solution based on spending-restricted prices. This is a generalization
of the idea used in [CG15]. We say that an item of type i is a high-price item if pi > 1 and a
low-price item otherwise. Also, we denote H(p) by the set of high-price item types.
Lemma 2.8. Let p be a spending-restricted price vector and x∗ be an optimal integral solution. If
the valuations of the agents are normalized for p then
(∏
a
ua(x
∗)
)1/n
≤

 ∏
i∈H(p)
pkii


1/n
.
Proof. First we give a bound on the sum of the agents’ utilities in any allocation based on the
spending-restricted price vector p. Consider a fractional spending-restricted allocation x corre-
sponding to p. Since valuations of the agents are normalized, each agent receives exactly 1 unit
of utility in x. However, x may not fully allocate the items to the agents, since high-price items
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may not be completely sold. Each one of the high-price items generates 1 unit of utility in x since
the total spending on it is precisely 1. Let y be an allocation in which we allocate the rest of each
high-price item of type i to one of the agents spending on it, hence generating pi − 1 more utility.
Therefore, the total utility that all the items generate in y is:
n+
∑
i∈H(p)
(pi − 1) = n−
∑
i∈H(p)
ki +
∑
i∈H(p)
kipi.
We will show that the total utility of all the agents in any allocation cannot be larger than this.
Consider the items of type i. In y, each one of those items generates either pi or more than pi
utility. Moreover, any agent that can derive more than pi utility from an item actually receives the
item in y. Therefore, y allocates the items to the agents such that the total utility all the items
generate is maximized. It follows that for any integral allocation z,∑
a
ua(z) ≤
∑
a
ua(y) = n−
∑
i∈H(p)
ki +
∑
i∈H(p)
kipi.
Notice that
∑
i∈H(p) ki is the total number of high-price items. Therefore, n −
∑
i∈H(p) ki is
a lower bound on the number of agents receiving only low-price items. Moreover, in any integral
allocation z, a high-price item must be assigned to only one agent.
We claim that the product
∏
a ua(z) is maximized if each high-price item of type i generates pi
utility, no agent receives more than one high-price item, and all other agents who do not receive
any high-price item derive exactly 1 unit of utility. In that case, the product
∏
a ua(z) is exactly∏
i∈H(p) p
ki
i .
Next, we prove the claim stated in the previous paragraph. We may assume that a high-price
item of type i generates pi utility since this can only increase
∏
a ua(z). Suppose there is an agent
a receiving a high-price item together with one or more items. It follows that the total utility of
agents receiving only low-price items is strictly less than n −
∑
i∈H(p) ki. Since there are at least
n−
∑
i∈H(p) ki of them, there must be an agent a
′ having less than 1 utility. Transferring all value
but the high-price item from a to a′ makes the product
∏
a ua(z) larger. Therefore, if an agent
receive a high-price item, he should not receive anything else. For agents receiving only low-price
items, their total utility is at most n −
∑
i∈H(p) ki and the product is maximized if each of them
derives exactly 1 unit of utility.
2.3.2 Rounding
We give a generalized version of the rounding procedure proposed in [CG15].
Algorithm The first step of the of the rounding algorithm constructs a bipartite spending graph
G whose vertices are agents and individual items as follows. For each superior item of type i, add
an edge between i and the corresponding agent a, and let a spend pi + qaij on the item. Note
that a is the only agent spending on this item. For the remaining items of type i, partition their
allocation into units arbitrarily. Add edges between each unit and the agents who receive parts of
this unit. Note that the total spending on each item is at most 1 in G.
After that, we invoke the rounding procedure of [CG15] on the above spending graph. The
algorithm is given in Figure 3, and the steps are explained below.
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By rearranging the spending of the agent, we may assume that G is a forest of trees. Moreover,
each tree in the forest must contain an agent-vertex since an item is assigned to at least one agent
in x.
Step 2 of the algorithm chooses an arbitrary agent-vertex from each tree to be the root of the
tree. Steps 3 and 4 then assign any leaf-item and item with price less than 1/2 to its parent-agent.
Step 5 of the algorithm computes the optimal matching of the remaining items to the agents,
given the assignments that have been made in the previous steps. This can be done by computing a
matching that maximizes sum of the logarithms of the valuations, which is equivalent to maximizing
the product of the valuations.
z = SpendingRestrictedRounding (p,x)
Input: Spending-restricted equilibrium price p, and the corresponding fractional allocation x.
Output: Integral allocation z.
1. Compute a spending graph G from agents to items according to x.
2. Choose a root-agent for each tree in the G.
3. Assign any leaf-item to the parent-agent.
4. Assign any item j of type i with pi ≤ 1/2 to the parent-agent.
5. Compute the optimal matching of the remaining items to the adjacent agents.
6. Return the obtained integral allocation.
Figure 3: Algorithm for Rounding a Spending-Restricted Fractional Allocation.
Approximation Guarantee We show that the rounding algorithm gives a factor 2 approxima-
tion by constructing an instance of NSW problem under linear utilities that has the same upper
bound as the one in Lemma 2.8. A solution under linear utilities obtained by the rounding pro-
cedure in Figure 3 can then be viewed as a solution under SPLC utilities. Since the rounding
procedure gives a solution under linear utilities that is at least a factor 2 of the upper bound
in Lemma 2.8 (as shown in [CDG+16]), it will follow that the same solution is also a factor 2
approximation under SPLC utilities.
An NSW Instance under Linear Utilities Given a spending restricted allocation x and
corresponding prices p under SPLC utilities, we build another instance Ilinear of NSW under linear
utilities. The instance has the same set of agents and items as the original instance Isplc under
SPLC utilities. However, valuations have to be redefined as follows:
1. For each agent a, consider each item (a, i, j) assigned (fractionally) to a.
(a) If it is a superior item, let it have a valuation of pi+ qaij for a and 0 for all other agents.
(b) If it is an active item, let it have a valuation of pi for a.
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2. Set all remaining valuations to 0.
Spending-Restricted Model under Linear Utilities Since a market under linear utilities is
a special case of the one under SPLC utilities, our definition of spending-restricted allocation in
Section 2.1 also applies to the linear utilities case. To be precise, a spending-restricted equilibrium
under linear utilities is defined as a fractional solution x and a price vector p such that every agent
spends all of his budget on his maximum bang-per-buck items at price p, and the total spending
on each item i is equal to min(1, pi). Also, Lemma 2.8 can be applied to the linear utilities case.
Lemma 2.9. Let x and p be a spending-restricted solution for Isplc. Then x is also a spending
restricted solution for Ilinear. Moreover, Lemma 2.8 gives the same upper bound for both Isplc and
Ilinear.
Proof. First we give a spending-restricted equilibrium price p′ for Ilinear under x. Notice that by
the way we construct Ilinear, each item has the same valuation for all agents that it is assigned to
in x. We price the item at that valuation. It can easily be seen that under such p′, each agent has
bang-per-buck value of 1 and spends all his budget on maximum bang-per-buck items.
Since x and p is a spending-restricted solution for Isplc, the base spending on each item of type
i is exactly min(1, pi). Base spending only differs from total spending at items where the agents
have to pay extra utility money. On each of those items, the total spending, and hence the price
under p′, must be less than 1 since the item is assigned completely to only one agent. It follows
that total spending on each item i is equal to min(1, p′i) under x and p
′.
Finally, the sets of high-price items with respect to p and p′ are identical. Therefore, the
product in the RHS of the inequality in Lemma 2.8 has the same value in both cases. In other
words, it can serve as an upper bound for both Isplc and Ilinear.
By [CDG+16], applying the rounding procedure in Figure 3 to x gives an integral solution that
is at least factor 2 of the upper bound of Ilinear in Lemma 2.8. From Lemma 2.9, that upper bound
is also an upper bound of Isplc. We can state the main theorem.
Theorem 2.10. SpendingRestrictedRounding is a factor 2 approximation algorithm for NSW
under SPLC utilities.
3 Real Stable Polynomial Approach
In this section we prove Theorem 1.2. First, in Section 3.1 we give a short overview of stable
polynomials and we discuss the main tool that we use in our proof. Then, in Section 3.2 we prove
the theorem.
For a vector y, we write y > 0 to denote that all coordinates of y are more than 0. For two
vectors x,y ∈ Rn we define xy = (x1y1, . . . , xnyn). Similarly, we define x/y = (x1/y1, . . . , xn/yn).
For a vector x ∈ Rn, we define exp(x) := (ex1 , . . . , exn). For two vectors x,y ∈ Rn we define xy as∏n
i=1 x
yi
i . For a real number c ∈ R we write c
x to denote
∏n
i=1 c
xi .
3.1 Preliminaries
Stable polynomials are natural multivariate generalizations of real-rooted univariate polynomi-
als. For a complex number z, let Im(z) denote the imaginary part of z. We say a polynomial
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p(z1, . . . , zn) ∈ C[z1, . . . , zn] is stable if whenever Im(zi) > 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, p(z1, . . . , zn) 6= 0. As
the only exception, we also call the zero polynomial stable. We say p(.) is real stable, if it is stable
and all of its coefficients are real. It is easy to see that any univariate polynomial is real stable if
and only if it is real rooted.
For a polynomial p, let deg p be the maximum degree of all monomials of p. We say a polynomial
p ∈ R[z1, . . . , zn] is degree k-homogeneous, or k-homogeneous, if every monomial of p has total
degree exactly k. Equivalently, p is k-homogeneous if for all a ∈ R, we have
p(a · z1, . . . , a · zn) = a
kp(z1, . . . , zn).
For a polynomial p ∈ R[z1, . . . , zn] and a vector κ ∈ Z
n, let Cp(κ) be the coefficient of the
monomial
∏n
i=1 z
κi
i in p.
The following facts about real stable polynomials are well-known
Fact 3.1. If p, q ∈ R[z1, . . . , zn] are real stable, then p · q is also real stable.
Fact 3.2. For any nonnegative numbers a1, . . . , an, the polynomial a1z1 + · · ·+ anzn is real stable.
The following theorem is proved by Gurvits and was the key to the recent application of stable
polynomials to the Nash welfare maximization problem [AOSS17].
Theorem 3.3 ([Gur06]). For any n-homogeneous stable polynomial p ∈ R[z1, . . . , zn] with nonneg-
ative coefficients,
Cp(1, 1, . . . , 1) ≥
n!
nn
inf
z>0
p(z1, . . . , zn)
z1 . . . zn
.
We use the following generalization of the above theorem which was recently proved in [AO17].
Theorem 3.4 ([AO17]). For any real stable polynomials p, q ∈ R[z1, . . . , zn] with nonnegative
coefficients,
e−min{deg p,deg q} · sup
α
inf
y,z>0
p(y)q(αz)
(yz)α
≤
∑
κ∈Zn
+
κ!Cp(κ)Cq(κ). (2)
sup
α≥0
inf
y,z>0
p(y)q(αz)
(yz)α
≥
∑
κ∈Zn
+
κ
κCp(κ)Cq(κ). (3)
where κ! :=
∏n
i=1 κi!.
Furthermore, it was shown in [AO17] that one can optimize sup
α≥0 infy,z>0
p(y)q(αz)
(yz)α using
classical convex programming tools. Equivalently, it is enough to optimize the following convex
function
sup
α≥0
inf
y,z>0
log
p(exp(y))q(α exp(z))
e〈α,y〉e〈α,z〉
,
where 〈α,y〉 :=
∑n
i=1 αiyi.
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3.2 Main Proof
In this part we prove Theorem 1.2. Our main tool is Theorem 3.4. To use that, first we need to
construct two real stable polynomials p, q. Then, we use Theorem 3.4 to write a convex relaxation
for the Nash welfare objective with SPLC utilities. Finally, we will describe our rounding algorithm
and prove the correctness.
Let T be the set of all triplets (a, i, j) where a ∈ [n], i ∈ [m] and j ∈ [ki]. Let x ∈ R
T
+ be a
vector; ideally we would like x to be an allocation vector. For a vector x, let px ∈ R[y1, . . . , ym] be
the following real stable polynomial:
px(y1, . . . , ym) =
n∏
a=1

 m∑
i=1
ki∑
j=1
xaijuaijyi

 .
Observe that if x is an integral allocation vector then px(1, 1, . . . , 1) is the Nash welfare correspond-
ing to x. The polynomial px is real stable since stable polynomials are closed under multiplication,
Fact 3.1, and any linear function with nonnegative coefficients is real stable, Fact 3.2. It is not
hard to see that px is n-homogeneous and has nonnegative coefficients (since uaij ≥ 0).
Let us characterize all possible monomials of px. For a set S ⊆ T let eS be the vector where
for all i ∈ [m], (eS)i denotes the number of triplets of the form (., i, .) in S, i.e.,
(eS)i := |{(a, i, j) ∈ S : a ∈ [n], j ∈ [ki]}|.
Let us describe the monomials of px. For every set S ∈
(T
n
)
define C(S) in the following way
C(S) :=
{∏
(a,i,j)∈S uaij if S has one element of the form (a, ., .) for every a ∈ [n],
0 otherwise.
Abusing notation slightly, for every set S ∈
(T
n
)
, define Cpx(S) as follows:
Cpx(S) := C(S)
∏
(a,i,j)∈S
xaij .
Then the following holds:
px(y) =
∑
S∈(Tn)
Cpx(S)y
eS .
We remark that different sets S can produce the same eS . So the above expression is not necessarily
the standard way of writing a polynomial as a sum of monomials, i.e. the above monomials can be
merged.
Note that if x is a {0, 1} vector, then for any S where (eS)i > ki for some i, Cpx(S) = 0; In
other words, for an integral x, the degree of yi in px is at most ki. But if x is not integral, this is
not necessarily true. Ideally, we would like to avoid these bad sets because they may unboundedly
increase the value px for fractional allocation vectors. We specifically choose a real stable polynomial
q such that the maximum degree of yi in q is at most ki.
Let K :=
∑m
i=1 ki. Define the following real stable polynomial
q(y) =
1
(K − n)!
∂K−nt
m∏
i=1
(t+ yi/ki)
ki
∣∣∣
t=0
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In words, q is equal to the coefficient of monomial tK−n in the polynomial
∏m
i=1(t+yi/ki)
ki . Observe
that by definition, the degree of yi in q is at most ki. Furthermore, q(y) is n-homogeneous.
Let S ⊆ 2T be a family of subsets of T , consisting of all subsets S where |S| = n and (eS)i ≤ ki
for all i ∈ [m]. The following lemma is immediate from the above discussion.
Lemma 3.5. ∑
κ∈Zn+
κ
κCpx(κ)Cq(κ) =
∑
S∈S
eS
eSCpx(S)Cq(eS).
Next, we will use Theorem 3.4 on polynomials p and q to design our relaxation and approx-
imation algorithms. First, we show the following lemma. We will then use it to write a convex
relaxation of the optimum solution.
Lemma 3.6. For any integral allocation vector x,
sup
α≥0
inf
y,z>0
px(y)q(αz)
(yz)α
≥
∏
a
ua(x). (4)
Proof. Since px, q are real stable polynomials with nonnegative coefficients by Theorem 3.4, (3),
we have
sup
α≥0
inf
y,z>0
px(y)q(z)
(yz/α)α
≥
∑
κ∈Zn
+
κ
κCpx(κ)Cq(κ) =
∑
S∈S
Cpx(S)Cq(eS)
m∏
i=1
(eS)i
(eS)i
where we used Lemma 3.5.
Now, let us calculate Cq(eS). Observe that the coefficient of y
(eS)i
i t
ki−(eS)i in
(t+
∑
a,j
yi/ki)
ki
is exactly equal to k
−(eS)i
i
( ki
(eS)i
)
. Therefore,
Cq(eS) =
m∏
i=1
k
−(eS)i
i
(
ki
(eS)i
)
. (5)
Therefore
∑
S∈S
Cpx(S)Cq(eS)
m∏
i=1
(eS)i
(eS)i =
∑
S∈S
Cpx(S)
m∏
i=1
k
−(eS)i
i (eS)i
(eS)i
(
ki
(eS)i
)
=
∑
S∈S
Cpx(S)
m∏
i=1
(eS)i−1∏
j=0
(ki − j)(eS)i
ki((eS)i − j)
≥
∑
S∈S
Cpx(S) = px(1, 1, . . . , 1),
where in the inequality we used that (eS)i ≤ ki. Finally, to conclude the lemma, note that px(1) =∏
a ua(x).
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Next, we use (4) to write a convex relaxation for the optimum solution.
sup
x,α≥0
inf
y,z>0
px(y)q(αz)
(yz)α
,
s.t.
n∑
a=1
ki∑
j=1
xaij ≤ ki ∀i
xaij ≤ 1 ∀a, i, j
(6)
It follows by (4) that the above mathematical program is a relaxation of the optimum. Furthermore,
observe that we can turn the above program into an equivalent convex program by a change variable
y↔ exp(y) and z↔ exp(z). This proves the first part of Theorem 1.2.
Next, we describe our rounding algorithm. Let x be an optimal solution of the convex program.
W.l.o.g. we can assume that for all i,
∑n
a=1
∑ki
j=1 xaij = ki. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ m, choose ki samples
independently from all triplets of the form (., i, .), where (a, i, j) is chosen with probability xaij/ki;
if (a, i, j) is sampled, assign one of the copies of item i to agent a. For each (a, i, j), let Xaij be the
random variable indicating that (a, i, j) is sampled (at least once).
for each item type i do
for t = 1→ ki do
Sample a, j with probability xaij/ki. Assign one of the copies of item i to agent a.
end for
end for
Observe that the utility of agent a at the end of the rounding procedure is at least
ua(x) ≥
m∑
i=1
ki∑
j=1
Xaijuaij .
Note that we have an inequality as opposed to equality because a may only receive two copies of
item i because (a, i, 1) and (a, i, 3) are sampled; in this case we write uai1+uai3 in the above sum to
denote the utility of a from item i, whereas the true utility of a from item i is uai1+uai2 ≥ uai1+uai3.
Therefore the expected Nash welfare of the rounding algorithm is at least
E[ALG] ≥ E

 n∏
a=1

 m∑
i=1
ki∑
j=1
Xaijuuij



 = ∑
S∈S
E
[ ∏
(a,i,j)∈S
Xaij
]
C(S) (7)
The following key lemma lower bounds E
[∏
(a,i,j)∈S Xaij
]
for a given S ∈ S.
Lemma 3.7. For any set S ∈ S,
E

 ∏
(a,i,j)∈S
Xaij

 ≥ ∏
(a,i,j)∈S
xaij
ki
(
m∏
i=1
e−(eS)i
ki!
(ki − (eS)i)!
)
.
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Proof. Note that the rounding procedure is independent for different item types. So it is enough
to separate this inequality, and prove it for each item type. So let us fix an item type i ∈ [m] and
let Si = S ∩ {(., i, .)}. We will show that
E

 ∏
(a,i,j)∈Si
Xaij

 = P[Xaij = 1,∀(a, i, j) ∈ Si] ≥ e−(eS)i ki!
(ki − (eS)i)!
∏
(a,i,j)∈Si
xaij
ki
. (8)
If Xaij = 1 for all (a, i, j) ∈ Si, then we can define the function t : Si → {1, . . . , ki}, where t(a, i, j)
represents the time that (a, i, j) was first sampled. Note that t is necessarily injective.
Now, for any injective function t : Si → [ki], consider the event Et defined in the following way:
(a, i, j) was sampled at time t(a, i, j) for every (a, i, j) ∈ Si and at every other time t
′ /∈ t(Si), the
sampled triplet (a′, i, j′) was not in S.
By definition, the events Et are disjoint for different functions t. Therefore
E

 ∏
(a,i,j)∈Si
Xaij

 ≥ ∑
t:Si→[ki] injective
P[Et].
Let
z =
∑
(a,i,j)∈Si
xaij/ki
be the probability that at any given time, a triplet (a, i, j) ∈ S is sampled. Then, Et occurs with
probability
(1− z)ki−(eS)i
∏
(a,i,j)∈Si
xaij
ki
≥ (1− (eS)i/ki)
ki−(eS)i
∏
(a,i,j)∈S
xaij
ki
≥ e−(eS)i
∏
(a,i,j)∈Si
xaij
ki
.
The first inequality uses that z ≤ (eS)i/ki and the last inequality uses that (1− z/k)
k−z ≥ e−z for
all 0 ≤ z ≤ k. Equation (8) follows from the above and the fact that there are ki!/(ki − (eS)i)!
choices for t : Si → [ki]. This completes the proof of the lemma.
Now, we are ready to finish the proof of Theorem 1.2. We show that the expected Nash welfare
of the rounded solution is at least e−2n sup
α≥0 infy,z>0
px(y)q(αz)
(yz)α .
It follows by the above lemma that the expected Nash welfare of the allocation of the rounded
solution is at least
E[ALG] ≥
∑
S∈S
C(S)
∏
(a,i,j)∈S
xaij
ki
m∏
i=1
e−(eS)i
ki!
(ki − (eS)i)!
= e−n
∑
S∈S
Cpx(S)
m∏
i=1
ki!
k
(eS)i
i (ki − (eS)i)!
(9)
On the other hand, since px, q are real stable with nonnegative coefficients and are n-homogeneous,
by Theorem 3.4, (2), we have
sup
α≥0
inf
y,z>0
px(y)q(αz)
(yz)α
≤ en
∑
S∈S
eS ! · Cpx(S)Cq(eS).
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Therefore, by (5) we can write,
sup
α≥0
inf
y,z>0
px(y)q(αz)
(yz)α
≤ en
∑
S∈S
eS!Cpx(eS)Cq(eS)
= en
∑
S∈S
Cpx(S)
m∏
i=1
(eS)i!
(
ki
(eS)i
)
k
(eS)i
i
= en
∑
S∈S
Cpx(S)
m∏
i=1
ki!
k
(eS)i
i (ki − (eS)i)!
≤ e2nE[ALG].
The last inequality follows from (9).
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